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NEW DELHI, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1955

NOTICE

The undermentioned *Gazettes of India Extraordinary* were published upto the 15th October 1955 :—

Issue No.	No. and date	Issued by	Subject
134	No. 59-ITC(P.N.)/55 dated the 10th October, 1955.	Ministry of Commerce and Industry	Import Policy of washers in July—December, 1955 period.
	No. 61-ITC(P.N.)/55, dated the 10th October, 1955.	Ditto	Import of Newsprint against licences issued during January—June, 1955 period.
	No. Eng. Ind. 17(17)/55, dated the 10th October, 1955.	Ditto	Recommendations of the Tariff Commission sought for fixing the prices of Locomotives and Boilers supplied by TELCO.
135	No. F.268-T/55, dated the 11th October, 1955.	Lok Sabha Secretariat	The President summons the Lok Sabha to meet on the 21st November, 1955.
136	No. F.40(6)/55-G, dated the 12th October, 1955.	Ministry of Law	Declaration regarding Election to fill casual vacancy in the House of the People.
	No. Ch. Ind. 33(11)/52, dated the 11th October, 1955.	Ministry of Commerce and Industry	Appointment of a Committee to examine the production of alcohol in India.
	No. 62-ITC(PN)/55, dated the 12th October, 1955.	Ditto	Corrections of entries in Red Book regarding the import of Ball bearings.

Copies of the *Gazettes Extraordinary* mentioned above will be supplied on Indent to the Manager of Publications, Civil Lines, Delhi. Indents should be submitted so as to reach the Manager within ten days of the date of issue of these *Gazettes*.

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PART I—Section 1

Notifications relating to Non-Statutory Rules, Regulations and Orders and Resolutions issued by the Ministries of the Government of India (other than the Ministry of Defence) and by the Supreme Court

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

CORRIGENDUM

New Delhi, the 13th October 1955

No. Eng. Ind. 25(4)/52.—In paragraph 1 of the Ministry's Resolution No. Eng. Ind. 25(4)/52, dated the 20th September, 1955, published in Part I Section I of the Gazette of India, dated 24th September, 1955.

For the entry "(2) Maj. Jadeja—Corps of Engineers, Ministry of Defence".

Please read "(2) Maj. J. M. Jadeja, Deputy Assistant Controller of Development, Ministry of Defence."

R. VENKATESWARAN, Dy. Secy.

MINISTRY OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

RESOLUTION

New Delhi, the 8th October 1955

No. F.8-2/55—Coop.—The Government of India have decided to set up a Committee with a view to evolving a co-ordinated policy for Rural Credit Development.

The Committee will consist of the following:—

Chairman

- (i) Secretary, Ministry of Food & Agriculture.

Members

- (ii) Joint Secretary (Co-operation), Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
 (iii) Secretary, Ministry of Finance (E. & A. Department).
 (iv) Shri B. Venkatappiah, I.C.S., Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India.
 (v) Secretary, Community Projects Administration.
 (vi) A representative of the Ministry of Production.
 (vii) Chief of Agriculture Division, Planning Commission.

Member Secretary

- (viii) Co-operation Adviser.

The Committee may co-opt. an expert on Co-operation or a representative of the State Government, whenever necessary.

2. The functions of the Committee will be:

- (i) To ensure adequate supply of credit resources for rural development and to avoid their wasteful use;
 (ii) To exchange information about overall and detailed plans of development and extension of Rural Credit;
 (iii) To co-ordinate the provision of Rural Credit organised and sponsored by various agencies in the sphere of marketing, warehousing and processing of agricultural produce; and
 (iv) Co-ordination of activities of the co-operative staff in the N.E.S. and Community Projects Blocks with the work of the other staff of the Co-operative Department in the States.

3. The Committee will meet as frequently as necessary but not less than three times in a year.

S. T. RAJA, Joint Secy.

MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

RESOLUTION

New Delhi, the 11th October 1955

No. 47(1)/55-SRI.—In supersession of this Ministry's Resolution No. 47(3)/51-SRI, dated the 16th November, 1951, as amended from time to time, the President is pleased to appoint the following persons as Chairman

and members of the Advisory Committee to assist the Government of India in the working and development of the Indian National Scientific Documentation Centre:—

COMPOSITION

Chairman

Shri R. K. Ramadhyani, I.C.S., Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research:

Members

1. Prof. M. S. Thacker, Director, Scientific and Industrial Research, New Delhi.
2. Dr. K. S. Krishnan, F.R.S., Director, National Physical Laboratory, New Delhi.
3. Dr. D. S. Kothari, Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence.
4. Dr. C. G. Pandit, Secretary, Indian Council of Medical Research.
5. Dr. S. R. Ranganathan, President, Indian Library Association, University of Delhi.
6. Shri D. D. Gupta, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research.
7. Shri G. K. Chandiramani, Special Officer (Technical), Ministry of Education.
8. Dr. B. P. Pal, Director, Indian Agricultural Research Institute, New Delhi.
9. Dr. K. N. Mathur, Deputy Director, National Physical Laboratory, New Delhi.
10. Shri R. P. Bahadur, Secretary, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, New Delhi.

Member Secretary

Dr. P. Sheel, Head, Indian National Scientific Documentation Centre.

FUNCTIONS

To advise the Government of India on all matters concerning the Indian National Scientific Documentation Centre.

D. D. GUPTA, Dy. Secy.

MINISTRY OF WORKS, HOUSING AND SUPPLY

New Delhi, the 13th October 1955

No. S&PII-101(13)/54.—In pursuance of sub-rule (5) of rule 9A of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884 (IV of 1884), the Government of India hereby publishes the Report of Inquiry into the accident which occurred at the Morani Fire Works, Andheri, Bombay on the 24th August, 1954 submitted by Shri M. M. Dhruv, Presidency Magistrate, Bombay.

REPORT

(1) An accident by explosion followed by fire occurred in the Morani Fire Works, situated at Parsi-Panchayat Road, Andheri, Bombay, on 24th August, 1954, as a result of which, besides damage to property, as many as 19 human lives were lost. By their order No. S&P.II.101(13)/54, dated 9th February, 1955, issued in the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply the Government of India have appointed me under Section 9A of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884, to hold an inquiry into the causes of the said accident and have appointed the Inspector of Explosives at Bombay as an assessor. Under Sub-Section (5) of that section, I have to make a report to the Central Government, stating the causes of the accident and its circumstances and adding any observations, which I or the assessor may think fit to make.

(2) With that end in view, an exhaustive inquiry came to be made and as many as 47 witnesses inclusive of the owner of the Factory, members of the Fire Brigade Staff who extinguished the fire and did the rescue work, the Police Officer who investigated the case and the Assistant Inspector of Explosives who made inquiries on behalf of the Explosives Department came to be examined. The owner of the Factory was served with a notice to take part in the inquiry. However by his application Ex. 2, he stated that he was disinclined to actively participate in the inquiry and cross-examine the witnesses as a criminal prosecution in respect of the accident was pending against him. However he stated that he and his Advocate would watch the proceeding and co-operate in the inquiry, which they did from beginning to end. Before I proceed to record my findings on the evidence of the witnesses and the other material produced on the record, it would be expedient to give an idea of the factory premises, and the manufacturing work that was going on therein, with a view to provide the circumstantial back-ground to the accident, which forms the subject matter of this inquiry.

(3) The factory is a proprietary concern of Mr. Ismail Sakur Morani, hereafter referred to as the licensee, and it is run by him in the name and style of Morani Fire Works. He holds a license No. B.O. 1167/F, dated 12th May, 1947 (Ex. 37) to manufacture, possess and sell 200 lbs. of Fire Works at a time in the licensed premises. The license was renewed from time to time and for the last time it was renewed on 28th April, 1954 for the period ending with 31st March, 1955. The licensed premises consist of three manufacturing sheds, one storage shed, one ingredients-shed and one drying platform which are more particularly described in the sketch of the factory Ex. 38 and their locations with reference to one another are also detailed therein. The three manufacturing sheds are located almost in the centre of the factory premises. They are in a line from south to north at a distance of about 20 ft. from one another and each of them admeasures about 15×12 ft. in area. For convenience of reference they are referred to as 1st, 2nd and 3rd manufacturing sheds in the body of this report, in their order from south to north. The storage shed and the ingredients shed are situated at a distance of 150 ft. to the east and the north-west of the manufacturing sheds respectively. The drying platform is situated at a distance of about 55 ft. to the west of the first manufacturing shed.

(4) Besides these constructions, three temporary sheds with tarpauline roofs admeasuring about 25 to 27 ft.×15 to 19 ft. came to be constructed by the side of the third manufacturing shed before about 1½ or 2 months of the accident. * [They are faithfully detailed in the sketch of the factory Ex. 38.] * Two of them adjoined one another and were located to the east of the third manufacturing shed, the nearer one being at a distance of about 15 ft. from that shed. The third of them was located at a distance of about 22 ft. to the north-west of the third manufacturing shed and for convenience of reference it is hereafter referred to as the northern temporary shed. Out of the other two, the one situated towards the east is referred to as the eastern temporary shed and the one situated towards the west is referred to as the western temporary shed. None of these sheds was sanctioned for the manufacture of fire-works.

(5) Indian Fire Works viz., Chidias, Chakris of several varieties, Anars (Fountains) and atom bombs alias noise-producing crackers were being manufactured in the factory along with Chinese crackers. At the time of the accident, the manufacture of these fire-works was authorisedly carried on in the three manufacturing sheds. As found on evidence below, after completion of the work of tube-filling for chakris, Anars were being manufactured in the first manufacturing shed, while chidias were being manufactured in the second and the third manufacturing sheds. The fire works were also unauthorisedly manufactured in the three temporary sheds, in an open place to the east of the second manufacturing shed, and under a mango-tree to the east of the northern temporary shed. As established on evidence below, the work of pasting paper discs on chidias and the work of winding up chakri-tubes was going on in the eastern and the western temporary sheds respectively. Miscellaneous work of winding up chakri-tubes, putting in fuses in crackers, pasting paper discs on chidias, inserting wires in chakris etc. was going on in the northern temporary shed. Three boys were removing chakris from their clips wherein they were put for being dried in the open place to the north of the second manufacturing shed, while some persons were pasting paper discs on chidias under the mango-tree to the east of the northern temporary shed. The manufacture of Fire Works was also carried on, on a very large scale, compared to the permissible quantity sanctioned by the license at these places as will be shown below.

(6) When the manufacture of fire works was going on in full form as detailed above, all of a sudden at about 3 P.M. on 24th August 1954, an explosion took place in the first manufacturing shed as testified by almost all the witnesses. It was so sudden that persons working therein could not find time to run away. It was so terrific that the whole of the first manufacturing shed was blown off, the splinters flying upto a distance of 150 ft. It created two crater-like depressions in the floor, one big and one small [as shown in photos Exs. 40 and 54.] Its loud report was heard by the Principal of Ismail College, Jogeshwari, at a distance of half a mile from the factory and even the utensils in the house of witness No. 25, who lives at a distance of 50 paces from the compound fencing of the factory, tumbled down on account of the air-waves created by it. It was so fatal that a large majority of workers, numbering nineteen, who were working in the three manufacturing sheds were caught in the fire that followed it and died either on the spot or after their removal to the Hospital. The fire which was generated in the first manufacturing shed due to explosion, quickly spread to the other two manufacturing sheds, which were seriously damaged, the second being damaged to a greater extent than the third. It also spread to the three temporary sheds which were completely gutted. It took about an hour for the Fire Brigade to extinguish the fire during which time, burning chidias flew here and there and thuds or burning crackers ranted the air. On hearing the loud report of the explosion, the workers took to flight. Almost all persons working in the temporary sheds and under the mango-tree found time to escape. Out of the witnesses examined before me, witnesses Nos. 5, 19, 22 and 35 received small injuries by burns on account of burning and flying chidias striking them. A burning chakri went through the muscles of witness No. 1's leg, which had to be amputated from just above the knee.

(7) As stated above, the fire generated by the explosion spread so quickly that a majority of workers working in the three manufacturing sheds could not find time to escape and as many as nineteen persons became the victims of the accident, seven of them being below sixteen years of age. Out of them eleven died on the spot and their dead bodies were recovered by the fire brigade staff. The remaining eight of them were rushed to the Hospital where they breathed their last within some hours of the accident. As stated by the Investigating Police Sub-Inspector Mr. C. D. Deo, hands and legs of one of the dead bodies found from the first manufacturing shed were missing. According to him, legs of one another dead body of a female were also missing. Mukadam Chhagan Sukar who died in the Hospital had his pelvis fractured, which must have happened either due to a fall or due to a violent injury following a blast as stated by Dr. S. B. Chadha, who examined and treated him. Out of the nineteen victims, fifteen were males, four of them being boys below 16 and four were females, three of them being girls below 16. Out of the dead bodies of these victims seventeen were identified, while the two remained unidentified. They were cremated by Police as no one claimed them. One of them was the dead body of a boy, while the other was that of a girl. One Sakhubal, wife of witness Mahadeo Vithal was working as a Mukadam in the Factory. She is not traceable after the accident and her dead body was not to be found amongst the dead bodies of the nineteen victims. Witness Yusuf Gulzar stated that as she had received burns on her legs, he had helped her in walking and had made her sit in a delivery van which was parked near the gate of the factory. Thus her death or disappearance remains a mystery unsolved.

(8) About the exact spots wherefrom the eleven dead bodies of the victims came to be recovered, the members of the Fire Brigade Staff and the Investigating Police Officer, who was present on the spot are not agreed. Thus Mr. B. G. Sawant, the Fire-Brigade Officer and Mr. C. D. Deo, the Investigating Sub-Inspector of Police stated that 2, 3 and 2 dead bodies were recovered from the first, second and third manufacturing sheds respectively, while 2 were recovered from the extension of the second manufacturing shed. Their statements are supported by the report Ex. 66 made by the former to his head office, immediately after the concurrence. The Tandel alias the Assistant of the Fire Brigade Officer and the driver of the Fire Brigade Engine, who also took part in the rescue work, stated that 8 and 3 dead bodies were recovered from the first and the second manufacturing sheds respectively. In my view, the difference in the two versions must be attributed to the speed with which the rescue operations had to be performed and the excitement of the moment, as none of the four witnesses had any reason to tell anything but the truth. Any way whether this version be accepted or that, one thing is clear that all these unfortunate victims were trapped in the fire in one or the other

of the manufacturing sheds and lost their lives as they could not escape. The eight persons who were rushed to the Hospital also died of burns by fire. One of them Sukar Babu is testified to have been working in the second manufacturing shed by witnesses Nos. 10 and 11 who were working in that shed. About the others there is no direct evidence as to the place where they were working as the licensee could not give the names of persons working in the manufacturing sheds and the direct evidence of witnesses also does not throw any light on the point. However as all of them died of burns due to fire, it can be safely inferred that they were also trapped in the fire in one or the other of the three manufacturing sheds, as the probability of their being trapped in fire elsewhere is ruled out by the record in view of the fact that the persons working in the temporary sheds and under the mango-tree had sufficient opportunities to escape. I would therefore find that all the nineteen victims died on account of their being trapped in fire in one or the other of the three manufacturing sheds.

(9) It would be now convenient to proceed to a consideration of the causes of the accident. All the witnesses are agreed that the accident started with the explosion, which was followed in quick succession by fire. Almost all of them are also agreed that the explosion took place in the first manufacturing shed and the fire started from there. I accept that position, as it is also born out by the very condition of the first manufacturing shed, which is completely blown off. The fire that started in the first manufacturing shed spread to the other two manufacturing sheds and damaged them considerably. It also spread to the three temporary sheds, and completely gutted them. It is not known whether any one from the first manufacturing shed survived. At least no such person has been available as a witness for this inquiry and therefore it is difficult to say what immediate cause led to the explosion. However witness No. 21, Shankar Baboo stated that he met Mukadam Chhagan Sukar, one of the victims of the accident, in the Hospital before his death and that he told him that the explosion took place as a box full of fire-works, which he was lifting, slipped from his hand and fell down. Chhagan Sukar was the licensee's Mukadam looking after the manufacture of fire-works and according to the licensee, he used to mix up composition powder and used to supervise the actual work of manufacturing fire-works. Thus his presence in the first manufacturing shed at the time of the explosion is quite probable. Mr. Phadnis, the Assistant Explosives Inspector stated that an explosion may take place if some heavy substance falls on loose composition powder. He also stated that in view of the two crater-like depressions caused in the floor of the first manufacturing shed, he was in a position to say that there must have been loose fire-works composition in that shed. In view of the size of the bigger depression, it can be safely taken that the loose powder must have been in existence in a pretty large quantity. In view of that fact it is quite probable, that the box containing fire-works might have slipped from Chhagan's hand and might have fallen on loose composition powder, giving rise to the explosion in question. Thus on a consideration of the direct evidence of witness No. 21 and the circumstantial probabilities, I am inclined to find that the explosion took place and fire started, as a box containing fire-works slipped from mukadam Chhagan Sukar's hand and fell on loose-composition powder in the first manufacturing shed.

(10) That would be the immediate cause of the accident. However it must be painfully remarked that the remote cause which subscribed to the gravity of the accident and which led to the loss of so many human lives is to be found in the very large scale manufacture of fire-works and the employment of too many workers in the actual process of manufacturing, both of which were absolutely disproportionate to the permissible maximum prescribed by the conditions of the license. According to condition No. 1 of the license, the licensee was authorised to manufacture and possess only 200 lbs. of fire works at a time in the licensed premises. According to condition No. 9(1) as read with the description of the licensed premises, he was entitled to carry on the manufacturing work only in the three manufacturing sheds and at no other place in the factory. It was also incumbent upon him not to employ more than four workers at any one time in each of the manufacturing sheds as required by condition No. 11. The employment of a child under 16 years of age was also specifically prohibited by rule 16 of the Explosives Rules, 1940 which is printed at the top of the license to attract the special attention of the licensee. All these conditions of the license and the legal requirements were respected more in breach than in the observance and in the present position of the record, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that, that added hugely to the gravity of the accident and the toll of human lives. The licensee himself was in the management of the

factory and used to attend it daily as stated by witnesses and as admitted by him. The manufacturing of Fire Works was also supervised by his mukadams according to his instructions as conceded by him. Thus, his responsibility for the breach of the license conditions and the legal requirements is beyond question.

(11) I would now proceed to a consideration of the evidence on which the above findings are based. It would be convenient to first show that the manufacturing of fire-works was carried on at authorised and unauthorised places and that it was carried on, on a very large scale compared to the permissible quantity sanctioned by the license. At the same time it would also be expedient to point out what particular items were manufactured at the respective places at the time of the accident. It is conceded on all sides that the manufacturing of fire-works was authorisedly going on in the three manufacturing sheds. About the actual work going on therein also, there is no disagreement between the licensee and the witnesses. Nine of the witnesses claimed to know about the actual work that was going on in the first manufacturing shed and all of them stated that tube-filling for chakris was going on in that shed at the time of the accident. The licensee stated that after completion of some chakri work which was to be done, the work of manufacturing Anars was directed to be performed in the first manufacturing shed. As a very large quantity (viz., 1200 lbs.) of burnt up Anars were found in and round about the first manufacturing shed after the accident, I am inclined to think that after completion of tube-filling for chakris, the work of manufacturing Anars was going on in that shed at the time of the accident. Eleven witnesses claimed to know about the work going on in the second and the third manufacturing sheds and all of them stated that manufacture of chidias was going on in those sheds at the time of the accident. The licensee also conceded to that position and therefore I accept it as a finding of fact.

(12) The licensee can be ill-expected to concede to the manufacture of fire-works at any other place, as that would amount to a contravention of an important condition of his license and like a prudent man of the world he stated that no manufacture of Fire Works was carried on at any other place. However there is credible evidence on record to show that manufacture of fire works was going on in the three temporary sheds and in an open place near the second manufacturing shed. It was also going on underneath a mango-tree near the northern temporary shed. In that connection it is important to note that as stated by Mr. Phadnis, the Assistant Inspector of Explosives, even finishing operation like pasting of paper discs, insertion of fuses and wires etc. are also parts of the process of manufacturing fire works and must be done in the authorised manufacturing sheds and at no other place in the factory.

(13) Witnesses Nos. 5, 17 and 22 were working in the eastern temporary shed. They and witnesses Nos. 8, 9 and 13 stated that pasting of paper discs on chidias was going on in that shed. Witness No. 1 stated that bending of wires was going on in that shed, while witness No. 10 stated that winding up of chakri-tubes was going on therein. However as witnesses Nos. 5, 17 and 12 were actually working in the shed, I would prefer to rely on their personal knowledge and find that pasting of paper discs on chidias was going on in the eastern temporary shed. Witnesses Nos. 2, 7 and 20 were working in the western temporary shed. They and witnesses Nos. 1 and 13 stated that the work of winding up chakri-tubes was going on in that shed. Witnesses Nos. 9, 10 and 34 stated that the work of pasting paper discs on chidias was going on in that shed. However as witnesses Nos. 2, 7 and 20 were working in the shed in question, they can be expected to have personal knowledge of the work which was going on in that shed at the time of the accident. I would therefore prefer to accept their evidence and would find that the work of winding up chakri-tubes was going on in the western temporary shed. Witnesses Nos. 2, 9, 13, 15, 21, 34 and 35 were working in the northern temporary shed. According to them, miscellaneous work was going on in that shed. Thus witnesses Nos. 2 and 21 were winding up chakri-tubes, No. 9 was putting fuses in crackers, No. 13 was pasting paper discs on chidias, No. 15 was bending wires of chakris, No. 34 was inserting wires in chakris and No. 35 was making paper tubes for chakris. The work done by witnesses Nos. 15 and 35 was non-explosive work, while the work done by others was explosive in nature and represented various stages of the manufacture of Fire Works. Witnesses Nos. 14, 16, 19, 27, 37 and 38 were working underneath a mango-tree near the northern temporary shed. Out of them witnesses Nos. 14 and 37 were doing the non-explosives work of putting cardboard discs in empty chidia containers, while the rest were pasting paper discs on chidias, which represent-

ed one of the final stages in the manufacture of that firework. Witnesses Nos. 1 and 3 stated that they and one third boy were removing chakris from clips, wherein they were put for being dried in an open place at a distance of 2 to 3 feet from the eastern door of the second manufacturing shed. That work was also a part of manufacturing work. Thus it is satisfactorily proved that manufacture of fireworks was going on at unauthorised places in the three temporary sheds, underneath a mangotree near the northern temporary shed and in an open place to the east of the second manufacturing shed.

(14) The manufacture of fireworks was also going on, on a very large scale, apparently on account of the advent of Diwali. Unfortunately the witnesses, a large majority of whom are illiterate or semi-illiterate villagers could not give an idea about the quantity of fireworks, which were under the manufacturing process at the time of the accident. However wisely enough, the Assistant Inspector of Explosives weighed the burnt up containers of fireworks after the accident and from the weightments made by him, it is possible to ascertain the extent of the manufacturing work carried on at various places in the factory. Before I proceed to a consideration of his evidence in that behalf, it is important to note that the quantity of fireworks permitted to be manufactured at a time includes the weight of the containers and all other non-explosives materials, used for the manufacture of a firework. Thus as far as this factory is concerned, the licensee was authorised to manufacture and possess at a time fireworks to the extent of 200 lbs., inclusive of the weight of containers and other non-explosive materials used in the manufacture of the fireworks. However Mr. Phadnis, the Assistant Inspector of Explosives stated that he found a large quantity of 1,200 lbs. of burnt up containers of Anars in and round about the first manufacturing shed. He further stated that he found about 500 lbs. of burnt up chidia containers in the second manufacturing shed and near its doors. He also stated that he found about 350 lbs. of burnt up chidia containers in the third manufacturing shed and near its doors. He added that he found about 175 lbs. of burnt up chidia containers between the second and the third manufacturing sheds. According to him he did not find any remnants of burnt up chakris, as they would be completely burnt up being made of paper. Thus inside the three manufacturing sheds and in their proximity about 2,225 lbs. of burnt up containers of Anars and chidias were found, which would represent a far larger quantity of manufactured fireworks, while in fact the license permitted the possession and manufacture of only 200 lbs. of fireworks at a time.

(15) As far as the temporary sheds and the open place under the mango tree are concerned the work of pasting paper discs on chidias was going on in the eastern temporary shed and under the mango tree. Some workers were also doing that work in the northern temporary shed. The Assistant Inspector found only 95 lbs. of burnt up chidia containers in and round about the place of the three temporary sheds and therefore it can be taken that chidia work was not carried on, on a large scale in the eastern and northern temporary sheds and under the mango tree. The winding up of Chakri-tubes was going on in the western temporary shed. That work and the work of inserting wires in chakris and putting in fuses in crackers was being done by a majority of workers in the northern temporary shed. The chakris and crackers, being made of paper, would have been completely destroyed by fire without leaving any remnants and therefore it would be difficult to say on what scale, the manufacture of those fire-works was going on in the western and the northern temporary sheds. However as found below, 17 to 18 and 20 to 25 workers were respectively working in those sheds and therefore in view of their number it can be safely inferred that the manufacture of fire-works must have been going on, on a large scale in the western and the northern temporary sheds.

(16) At this stage it would be convenient to ascertain the number of workers employed in the manufacture of fire works at the authorised and unauthorised places. As far as the authorised manufacturing sheds are concerned, a large majority of the workers working therein died in the explosion. Out of the survivors only two persons who were working in the second manufacturing shed could become available for giving evidence. Thus a conclusion as to the number of workers working in each of the manufacturing sheds, has to be arrived at from the evidence of those two witnesses and other witnesses working in the temporary sheds and round about places and from the number of deaths that occurred on account of the accident. Only five, seven and six witnesses claimed to respectively know about the number of workers working in the three manufacturing sheds. Witness No. 2 stated that 8 to 10

workers were working in each of those sheds at the time of the accident. Witness No. 3 supported him by stating that about nine workers were working in each of them. Witnesses Nos. 9 and 13 stated that 5 or 6 workers were working in the first manufacturing shed. The former of them stated that 10 persons were working in each of the second and the third manufacturing sheds while the latter stated that 8 to 9 persons were working in each of them. Witnesses Nos. 10 and 11 were working in the second manufacturing shed itself. The former of them stated that 5 or 7 persons were working in the second manufacturing shed. He gave names of four workers and stated that besides them two girls and two adult males whose names he did not know, were also working in that shed. Thus according to him 8 workers were working in the second manufacturing shed. He did not claim to know about the number of workers in the other two sheds. Witness No. 11 stated that 12 and 10 to 12 persons were working in the second and the third manufacturing sheds respectively, and gave names of nine persons working in the second shed, adding of course that he did not know the names of three other persons. He did not claim to know about the number of workers in the first manufacturing shed. Witness No. 7 differed from all the other witnesses and stated that only 2, 2 and 3 persons were working in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd manufacturing sheds. Now in all 19 persons died in the accident and as shown above there is reason to think that they were working in those sheds. In view of that fact it would be absurd to accept the evidence of this witness and think that only seven persons were working in these sheds. He did not appear to be responsible in giving his evidence and also did not impress me as a witness. His evidence therefore deserves to be rejected. Out of the other witnesses, witness No. 2 was working in the western temporary shed and witness No. 3 was working just, near the second manufacturing shed. Witnesses Nos. 9 and 13 were working in the northern temporary shed and witnesses Nos. 10 and 11 were working in the second manufacturing shed itself. Thus all of them were sufficiently near the manufacturing sheds to know about the number of workers working there. Their evidence is also supported by the number of deaths that occurred in the accident. I would therefore accept their evidence and find that 6 to 8 persons were working in the first manufacturing shed and 8 to 10 persons were working in each of the second and the third manufacturing sheds.

(17) Proceeding to the temporary sheds, 10 witnesses claimed to know about the number of workers working in the eastern temporary shed. Out of them witnesses Nos. 5, 17 and 22 were working in that shed, No. 7 was working in western temporary shed and Nos. 9 and 13 were working in the northern temporary shed. Witnesses Nos. 10 and 11 were working in the second manufacturing shed, No. 19 was working under the mango-tree and No. 31 was working in the office room. All of them agreed that only female workers were working in this shed but they did not agree about their number. Thus witnesses Nos. 5 and 7, No. 9, No. 10, No. 11, No. 13, Nos. 17 and 31, No. 19 and No. 22 respectively stated that 10 to 15, 75, 40, 30 to 40, 50, 15 to 20, 20 and 10 to 12 women were working in that shed. In view of the divergent figures given by the witnesses, I think it would be safe to only rely on the figures given by witnesses Nos. 5, 17 and 22, who were actually working in the shed in question as they alone can be expected to have personal knowledge about the number of their colleagues. I would therefore find that round about 15 females were working in the eastern temporary shed.

(18) As far as western temporary shed is concerned, only seven witnesses claimed to know about the number of workers working there. Out of them witnesses Nos. 2, 7 and 20 were working in that shed itself. Witnesses Nos. 9 and 13 were working in the northern temporary shed and witnesses Nos. 10 and 11 were working in the second manufacturing shed. All of them agreed that only male workers were working in that shed but they did not agree about their number. Thus witnesses No. 2, No. 7, Nos. 9 and 13, No. 10, No. 11 and No. 20 respectively stated that 17 to 18, 8 to 10, 50, 40, 30 to 40 and 4 to 5 workers were working in that shed. In view of the divergent figures given by the witnesses, it would be ordinarily safe to rely on the personal knowledge of the persons working in this shed. Witnesses Nos. 2, 7 and 20 were working in that shed. However out of them witness No. 7 is absolutely unreliable as stated above. Witness No. 20 appeared to be similar. He appeared to have no idea about anything nor did he depose to any material details. It is therefore not possible to accept his statement in face of the evidence of the other witnesses. Witness No. 2 appeared to be a smart and intelligent boy. On all important points he deposed consistently and impressed me as a reliable witness.

I would therefore accept his evidence and find that 17 or 18 male workers were working in the western temporary shed.

(19) As far as northern temporary shed is concerned, ten witnesses claimed to know about the number of workers working in that shed. Out of them witnesses Nos. 9, 13, 15, 21, 34 and 35 were working in that shed. Witnesses Nos. 10 and 11 were working in the second manufacturing shed, while witnesses Nos. 14 and 38 were working under the mango tree near that shed. Both males and females were working in this shed. However about their number the witnesses gave different figures. Witnesses No. 9, Nos. 10, 14 and 38, No. 11, No. 13, No. 15, No. 21, No. 34 and No. 35 respectively stated that 30, 20, 30 to 40, 25 to 30, 7 to 8, 8 to 10, 25, and 10 to 15 persons worked in that shed. In view of the divergent figures given by the witnesses, it would be safe to rely on the statements of the witnesses working in this shed. On a commutative consideration of their evidence, I am inclined to think that about 20 to 25 workers were working in the northern temporary shed.

(20) As observed above manufacturing of fireworks was also going on under the mango tree near the northern temporary shed and in an open place to the east of the second manufacturing shed. Witnesses Nos. 14, 16, 19, 27, 37 and 38 were working under the mangotree and all of them except Nos. 14 and 37 were manufacturing fireworks by pasting paper discs on chidias. Witnesses Nos. 1 and 3 and one another boy were working in the open space to the east of the second manufacturing shed and were removing chidias from clips wherein they were put for being dried. Thus at the time of the accident, about 23 to 28 workers were manufacturing fireworks in the three manufacturing sheds, about 52 to 59 workers were manufacturing fireworks in the temporary sheds and 9 workers were manufacturing fireworks under the mango tree and in the open place to the east of the second manufacturing shed, while in fact the license only authorised 12 workers to manufacture fireworks in the manufacturing sheds and at no other place. As stated by witness No. 9, the extra workers were asked to go away by the mukadams and the licensee, when the Inspector used to visit the factory, with a view to make a show that only the permissible number of workers were employed in the factory.

(21) The manufacturing of fireworks was carried on, on a very large scale as pointed out above and in my view that added hugely to the gravity of the accident and the toll of human lives. As many as 2225 lbs. of burnt up containers of anars and chidias, representing a far larger quantity of manufactured fireworks, were found inside and in the proximity of the three manufacturing sheds. Out of that quantity as many as 1200 lbs. of burnt up containers of anars were found in and round about the first manufacturing shed, suggesting thereby that the manufacture of fireworks was going on, on the largest scale in that shed. A large quantity of composition powder must also have been in existence in that shed, in view of the fact that the whole shed was completely blown off and two crater-like depressions were caused in its floor. If the manufacture of fireworks were restricted to the permissible maximum there would have been only 65 to 76 lbs. of fireworks, inclusive of composition powder in existence in each of the three manufacturing sheds. With that much quantity in the first manufacturing shed, the explosion which occurred therein, would not have been so serious and perhaps the fire which followed it, would have been restricted to that shed alone, as in all probability the shed would not have been blown off and the burning fireworks would not have reached upto the other sheds. Even if the fire had spread to the other manufacturing sheds, it would have been less furious in nature, if the manufacturing were restricted to the permissible maximum in those sheds. In that case there would have been greater chances for the workers to escape and in all probability the casualties would have been much less. Further if only four workers were employed in each of the manufacturing sheds as sanctioned by the license, naturally the loss of lives would have been restricted to at the most 12 lives and in no case it would have gone up to 19 lives, as in fact happened. Thus it can be safely found that the remote cause which subscribed to the gravity of the explosion and which led to the toll of so many human lives is to be found in the very, large scale manufacture of fireworks and the employment of too many workers in the actual process of manufacturing fireworks.

(22) Children below the age of 16 also came to be employed in the factory for doing the actual work of manufacturing fireworks, in contravention of rule 16 of the Explosives Rules, 1940. Out of the witnesses examined, eleven are boys and girls below 16 years of age. Out of them three boys and six girls were employed in the actual work of manufacturing fireworks

at the time of the accident. The three boys are witnesses Nos. 1, 3 and 10 and they were aged 14, 15 and 14 respectively. Witnesses Nos. 1 and 3 were removing 19, 27 and 38 and were aged 14, 14 to 15, 15, 14, 14 and 14 respectively. Witnesses Nos. 1 and 3 were removing chakris from their clips wherein they were put for being dried, witnesses Nos. 13, 16 and 27 were pasting paper discs on chidias, witnesses Nos. 17, 19 and 38 were applying paste to chidias and witness No. 10 was putting cardboard discs on chidias. Out of other witnesses examined at the inquiry, witnesses Nos. 9 and 34 were aged 17 and 16 respectively at the date of the accident. However they began their careers as children below 16 as they were employed before 3 years and one year respectively before the date of the accident. The former of them was putting fuses in crackers by means of a poker and the latter of them was inserting wires in chakris at the time of the accident. Out of the 19 victims of the accident, four boys and three girls were under the age of 16. As observed above, there is reason to think that all the nineteen victims were working in the three manufacturing sheds at the time of the accident. Thus in view of the number of children below 16, who died in the accident and in view of the evidence of the above referred nine witnesses, who were also under the age of 16 and who were actually manufacturing fireworks at the time of the accident, it can be safely found that children below 16 years of age were being freely employed for manufacturing fireworks in the factory in question.

(23) The manufacture of fireworks is a risky and dangerous process. Rule 19(2)(b) of the Explosives Rules, 1940 enacts that every person engaged in the manufacture of fireworks shall at all the times, observe all due precautions for the prevention of accidents by fire or explosion. In view of that legal requirement and in view of the risk involved in the manufacture of fireworks, it would be the duty of every licensee to give due instructions to the workers at the time of their employment, about the precautions to be observed while working in the factory. Twelve of the witnesses were asked whether such instructions were given to them at the time of their employment. Only four workers viz. witnesses Nos. 8, 9, 19 and 36 stated that such instructions were given to them while eight workers viz. witnesses Nos. 3, 13, 17, 22, 27, 35, 37 and 38 stated that no such instructions were given to them. Thus it can be reasonably remarked that no proper care was taken to give instructions to the workers about precautions to be observed, while working in the factory at the time of their employment.

(24) The above findings, with which the assessor and I are in complete agreement, may be summarised in a nut-shell as under:—

- (i) The explosion took place in the first manufacturing shed and fire started from there as a box containing fireworks slipped from mukadam Chhagan Sukar's hand and fell on loose composition powder in that shed. That was the immediate cause of the accident.
- (ii) The remote cause which subscribed to the gravity of the accident and which led to the loss of as many as nineteen human lives has to be attributed to the very large scale manufacture of fireworks and the employment of too many workers in the actual process of manufacturing both of which were absolutely disproportionate to the permissible maximum prescribed by the conditions of the license.
- (iii) Manufacturing of fireworks was authorisedly carried on in the three manufacturing sheds. It was also unauthorisedly carried on in three temporary sheds, in an open place to the east of the second manufacturing shed and under a mango tree, in contravention of condition No. 9(1) of the license as read with the description of the licensed premises.
- (iv) Condition No. 1 of the license authorised manufacture and possession of 200 lbs. of fireworks at a time. However in contravention of that condition, the quantity manufactured at the time of the accident was many times more.
- (v) According to condition No. 11 of the license, the licensee was entitled to employ only 12 workers, four in each of the three manufacturing sheds. However in contravention of that condition, 6 to 8 persons were working in the first manufacturing shed, while 8 to 10 persons were working in each of the second and the third manufacturing sheds. About 61 to 70 persons were manufacturing fireworks at unauthorised places viz., in the three temporary sheds, in an open place to the east of the second manufacturing shed and under a mango tree near northern temporary shed.

- (vi) Children below 16 years of age were being freely employed in the actual work of manufacturing fire-works in contravention of rule 16 of Explosives Rules, 1940.
- (vii) Proper care was not taken in giving instructions to the workers about precautions to be observed while working in the factory, as contemplated by rule 19(2) of the Explosives Rules, 1940.
- (viii) The licensee himself was in the management of the factory and the actual work of manufacturing was also supervised by his mukadams as per his instructions.

(25) The assessor and I propose to make one additional observation about the materials whereof the manufacturing sheds should be allowed to be constructed. If they are allowed to be constructed of some light materials which may give way to the force of an average individual, the risk of accidents and the consequent loss of human lives can be considerably decreased.

(26) The following are appended hereto for ready reference:—

- * (i) Sketch of the licensee's factory, marked as A.
- (ii) List of names of witnesses examined at the inquiry, marked as B.
- (iii) List of persons who died in the accident, marked as C.
- * (iv) Photo showing the second and the third manufacturing sheds and the debris of the first manufacturing shed after the accident, marked as D.
- * (v) 2 Photos showing the two crater-like depressions in the floor of the first manufacturing shed, marked as E & EI.
- * (vi) Photo showing the remnants of the three temporary manufacturing sheds, marked as F.
- * (vii) Photos of two unidentified dead bodies, marked as G & GI.
- * (viii) Photograph of the heap of burnt up containers of Anars which were collected and weighed, marked as H.
- * (ix) Photograph of the heap of burnt up containers of chidias which were collected and weighed, marked as I.

(Sd.) M. M. DHUV.

Inquiry Officer,

(Presidency Magistrate, Bombay).

Dated the 18th May, 1955.

*Not printed.

"B"

LIST OF WITNESSES WHO WERE EXAMINED AT THE INQUIRY

1. Namdeo Dharma Kamblekar, worker in the Factory.
2. Madhukar Shriram Divdane, worker in the Factory.
3. Sudam Shankar Kafer, worker in the Factory.
4. Vimal Baburao Malusare, worker in the Factory.
5. Anandibai Baburao Sawant, worker in the Factory.
6. Janabai Dhondur Asanankar, worker in the Factory.
7. Usman Mohamed, worker in the Factory.
8. Vasant Vithal Wade, worker in the Factory.
9. John Joseph D'Souza, worker in the Factory.
10. Digamber Vishram Dalvi, worker in the Factory.
11. Mahadeo Shankar Chavan, worker in the Factory.
12. Raman Narayan Mayekar, worker in the Factory.
13. Kusum Laltraprasad, worker in the Factory.
14. Krishnabai Pandurang Chindarkar, worker in the Factory.
15. Gurudas Hari Shirodkar, worker in the Factory.
16. Baby Mohanlal Murarji, worker in the Factory.

17. Sarojini Govind Nayar, worker in the Factory.
18. Peter D'Costa, fitter.
19. Shakuntala Vishnu Rani, worker in the Factory.
20. Bhimrao Ganpat Adhangale, worker in the Factory.
21. Shankar Baboo Duble, worker in the Factory.
22. Rukmini Gopal Naidu, worker in the Factory.
23. Mahadeo Vithal Gaikawad, Mukadam of licensee.
24. Vasant Pandurang Shetys, Tindal of fire Brigade Station, Andheri.
25. Sk. Yusuf Sk. Guljar, neighbour of the Factory.
26. Shrikant Sitaram Sawant, worker in the Factory.
27. Lila Ganoo Mokul, worker in the Factory.
28. Narsing Jairam Surve, motor driver in Bombay Fire Brigade.
29. Harilal Karsanji Vasa, clerk of licensee.
30. Jagdishchandra Shamrao Phadnis, Asst. Inspector of Explosives, Bombay.
31. Laxmi Jina Dhodi, mukadam of Licensee.
32. Shankar Aatmaram Aduskar, mukadam of Licensee.
33. Tukaram Namdeo Narvekar, mukadam of Licensee.
34. Shioram Gangaram Patil, worker in the Factory.
35. Laxmi Rama, worker in the Factory.
36. Sakhu Laxman Waigankar, worker in the Factory.
37. Haushibai Shankar Kafar, worker in the Factory.
38. Vishalasa Govind Nair, worker in the Factory.
39. Wasudeo Gopal Mayekar, worker in the Factory.
40. Kisan Mahadu Rajput, worker in the Factory.
41. Satdevsing Bir Singh Chadha, R.M.O., K.E.M. Hospital.
42. Bhaskar Govind Sawant, Fire Brigade Officer, Bombay.
43. Hemlata Vasant Kudalkar, worker in the Factory.
44. Nathalal Narsingdas Kanojia, Manager of Mogra, Consumers Co-operative Society at Andheri, & Social Worker.
45. Abdul Rehman Suleman Rawoof, Clerk of Fire Brigade.
46. Chandrashekhar Dhondiraj Dev, Investigating S.I. of Police, Andheri Police Station, Bombay.
47. Ismail Sakoor Morani, Licensee.

(Sd.) M. M. DHUV,

Inquiry Officer,

(Presidency Magistrate, Bombay).

Dated the 18th May, 1955.

"C"

LIST OF PERSONS WHO DIED IN THE ACCIDENT

Males aged more than 16 years.

Name	Age.
1. Alibhai Jhaver	40 years.
2. Karim Sultan Shaikh.	22 years.
3. Budhaji Bhika Dobla.	18 years.
4. Bhiva Kashinath Ghanekar.	22 years.
5. Chhagan Sukur Dubla.	45 years.
6. Ranchhod Valsa.	40 years.
7. Bhiku Babu.	18 years.
8. Ramesh Ganpat Kashelkar.	19 years.
9. Madhukar Tatoba.	16 years.
10. Vansha Raghu.	20 years.

Males aged less than 16 years

1. Vishnu Sajjan Kharvi.	13 years.
2. Bhau Jayram Kadam	15 years.
3. Sukur Prema Babu.	15 years.
4. Ganpat Jetha Dubla.	15 years.
5. One unidentified boy.	

Females aged less than 16 years

1. Lila Ramchandra Sawant, 12 years.
2. Palibai Babu, 15 years.
3. Gajarabai Merwan Dhodi, 15 years.
4. One unidentified girl.

(Sd.) M. M. DHURUV,

Inquiry Officer,

(Presidency Magistrate, Bombay)

Dated the 18th May, 1955.

C. A. Subramaniam, Dy. Secy.

MINISTRY OF PRODUCTION**RESOLUTION***New Delhi, the 10th October 1955*

No. 9/7/55-Salt.—The Government of India have decided that the membership of the Central Board and six Regional Boards constituted under the Resolution of the Ministry of Production, No. 9/1/54-Fy.II, dated the 11th October, 1954, will be as follows:—

CENTRAL BOARD*Chairman*

1. Joint Secretary, Ministry of Production.

Members

2. Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Production concerned with the administration of "Salt".
3. Representative of the Government of Bombay on the Salt Advisory Committee.
4. Representative of the Government of Madras on the Salt Advisory Committee.
5. Shri K. M. Thakore, Indian Salt Manufacturers' Association, Bombay.
6. Shri A. Suryanarayana Rao, Madras Provincial Salt Industrialists Association, Madras.
7. Shri B. K. Nair, General Secretary, Indian National Trade Union Congress, Kerala Branch, Collam Road, Alleppey (South India).
8. A representative of the Ministry of Finance, Government of India.
9. The Director, Central Salt Research Station, Bhavnagar.
10. Shri Jethalal Joshi, M.P.
11. Shri A. M. Thomas, M.P.

Member Secretary

12. The Salt Commissioner, New Delhi.

REGIONAL BOARDS**1. Madras.***Chairman*

1. The Salt Commissioner.

Members

2. Deputy Secretary (Revenue Department) Government of Madras, Madras.
3. Shri V. Selvaraj, President, Salt Labour Union, Arumuganeri—Central Government representative.
4. Shri M. S. Selvarajan, Secretary, Salt Labour Union, Arumuganeri—State Government representative.
5. Shri S. N. Chinnakannu Pillai, Salt Manufacturers and Merchants Association, Tuticorin.
6. Shri M. Chenchiah, B.A., Madras Provincial Salt Industrialists Association, Madras.
7. Sardar A. Vedaratnam Pillai, Salt Lessee, Vedaratnam, Distt. Tanjore.
8. Shri Thanu Pillai, M.P.

Secretary

Deputy Salt Commissioner, Madras.

2. Andhra.*Chairman*

1. The Salt Commissioner.

Members

2. Shri P. P. J. Vaidyanathan, I.C.S., Director of Industries and Commerce, Andhra, Madras.
3. Shri R. Satyanarayana Rao, General Secretary, Sri Krishna Salt Workers' Union, Nunabarthi, Pravada P.O., Anakapalli Taluk (Andhra)—Central Government representative.
4. Shri B. G. M. A. Narasinga Rao, President, Balacheruvu Salt Workers' Union, Visakhapatnam—State Government representative.
5. Shri A. Surianarayana Murthy, Madras and Andhra Provincial Salt Industrialists Association, Madras.
6. Shri Rednam Dharma Rao Naidu, Managing Director, Messrs. Gurunath and Apparao Ltd., Naupada.
7. Shri Alluri Satyanarayana Raju M.P.
8. Shri B. Ramachandra Reddy, M.P.

Secretary

Deputy Salt Commissioner, Madras.

3. Travancore-Cochin.*Chairman*

1. The Salt Commissioner.

Members

2. Assistant Excise Commissioner, Government of Travancore-Cochin, Trivandrum.
3. Shri R. Keshava Pillai, General Secretary, Chavara Minerals Works Congress, Kollthottam Chavara—Central Government representative.
4. Shri S. Nathanlal. B.A., B.L., President, Travancore Tamilnad Estate Workers' Union, Nagercoil—State Government representative.
5. Shri T. V. Ramasubba Iyer, Big Street, Vadeveeswaram, Nagercoil.
6. Shri V. S. Swaminathan Pillai, Cape Road, Nagarcoil.
7. Shri S. C. Karayalar, M.P.
8. Shri C. P. Mathen, M.P.

Secretary

Deputy Salt Commissioner, Madras.

4. West Bengal and Orissa.*Chairman*

1. The Salt Commissioner.

Members

2. Shri U. Chatterjee, Deputy Director of Industries (Research) Government of West Bengal, Calcutta.
3. Shri A. G. Menon, I.A.S., Secretary, Industries Department, Cuttack.
4. Shri Narendra Nath Sen, Vice-President, Indian National Trade Union Congress, Calcutta-12.—Central Government representative.
5. Shri Purusottam Behara, Village and P.O. Sumadi, District Ganjam (Orissa)—State Government representative.
6. Shri Manoj Dutta, B.L., Managing Director, Bengal Salt Co. Ltd., Contai (West Bengal).
7. Shri M. Yusuf, President, Orissa Salt Manufacturers' Association, Oriya Bazar, Cuttack.
8. Shri S. C. Samanta, M.P.
9. Shri Umacharan Patnaik, M.P.

Secretary

Assistant Salt Commissioner, Calcutta.

5. Saurashtra and Kutch.*Chairman*

1. The Salt Commissioner.

Members

2. Shri G. B. Shrivdasani, Deputy Secretary, Industry and Supply Department, Government of Saurashtra, Rajkot.
3. Shri P. K. Vora, Director of Industries, Kutch.
4. Shri Girishbhai Mehta, Mazdoor Sangh, B.B.Z. No. 14 Ltd., Gandhigram (Kutch)—*Central Government representative.*
5. Shri K. B. Shah, Indian National Trade Union, Congress, Rajkot—*State Government representative.*
6. Shri Mugatlal Kamdar, Indian Salt Manufacturers' Association, Bombay.
7. Shri Premji Jain of Messrs. Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Ltd., Dhrangadhra.
8. Shri Bhupatbhai Desai, M.L.A. (Saurashtra), Patri (District Ahmedabad).
9. Shri Bhogilal Maganlal Shah, M.P.

Secretary

Deputy Salt Commissioner, Bombay.

6. Bombay.*Chairman*

1. The Salt Commissioner.

Members

2. Deputy Director of Industries (General), Government of Bombay, Bombay.
3. Shri K. A. Dwar, Karanja, Uran Mahal, District Kolaba, Bombay—*Central Government representative.*
4. Shri M. G. Kotwal, President, Mithagar Kamgar Union, Uran—*State Government representative.*
5. Shri Maneckshaw S. Kotwal, Bombay Salt Merchants & Shilotries Association, 583-Chira Bazar, Bombay.
6. Shri Md. Mohassin Md. Amin Bhaiji, M.A., L.L.B., P.O. Uran, District; Kolaba.
7. Shri N. S. Kajrolkar, M.P.
8. Shri B.M. Gupta, M.P.

Secretary

Deputy Salt Commissioner, Bombay.

2.(a). The non-official members of the Central and Regional Boards, including those members to be nominated by rotation, will hold office for a period of two years from the date of notification appointing them as members.

(b) If a seat of a member nominated by a body or interest other than the Central Government, falls vacant, the Central Government shall, within two months of the vacancy by notice in writing, call upon the body or interest concerned to nominate a person to fill up the vacancy and the nomination shall be made within thirty days of the date of issue of such notice:

Provided that if the body or interest fails to make the nomination within the period specified, the Central Government may nominate a person to fill up the vacancy.

(c) If a nominated member is unable to attend a meeting, the Central Government or the body or interest which nominated him may, by notice in writing signed on its behalf and by the said member and addressed to the Chairman of the Central or Regional Board, nominate a substitute in his place to attend that meeting. Such a substitute shall have all the rights of a member in respect of that meeting.

(d) The quorum for a meeting of the various Boards shall be 5 members empowered to vote.

(e) A member nominated to fill a casual vacancy shall hold office as long as the member whose place he fills would have been entitled to hold office, if the vacancy had not occurred or if the nomination as required by the rule had been made.

(f) Every non-official member shall be entitled to travelling allowance and daily allowance as admissible under rules or approved by the Central Government from time to time.

(g) A non-official nominated member may resign his office by letter addressed to the Chairman of the Central or Regional Board, as the case may be.

(h) Before a non-official nominated member leaves India, he shall intimate to the Chairman of the Board concerned the date of his departure from and the date of his expected return to India, and if he intends to be absent from India for a period longer than 6 months, he shall tender his resignation. If any such member leaves India without complying with the above, he shall be deemed to have resigned with effect from the date of his departure from India.

(i) A nominated member shall be declared by the Chairman concerned to have vacated his office,

(i) if he becomes insolvent, or

(ii) if he is convicted of any offence, which, in the opinion of the Central Government, involves moral turpitude, or

(iii) if he is absent from 3 consecutive meetings of the Board without leave of absence from its Chairman, or

(iv) if, in the opinion of the Central Government, it is undesirable that he should continue to be a member of the Board.

(j) The Board shall meet at such place and time as may be appointed by its Chairman.

(k) A notice shall be given to every member present in India of the time and place fixed for each ordinary meeting at least 15 days before such meeting and each member shall be furnished with a list of business to be disposed of at that meeting:

Provided that when an emergent meeting is called by the Chairman, such notice shall not be necessary.

(l) No business, which is not on the list, shall be considered by a meeting without the permission of the Chairman of the Board concerned.

(m) The Chairman shall preside over the meetings of the Board at which he is present. If the Chairman is absent from any meeting, the members present shall elect one of the members to preside over the meeting and the member so elected shall at that meeting exercise all the powers of the Chairman.

(n) Every question at a meeting of the Board shall be decided by a majority of votes of the members present and voting on that question. In the case of equal division of votes, the Chairman shall give an additional vote.

(o) The proceedings of each meeting of the Board shall be circulated to all members present in India and thereafter recorded in a Minute Book, which shall be kept for permanent record.

The record of the proceedings of each meeting shall be signed by the Chairman of the Board.

(p) Proposals for expenditure in a Region to be met from the proceeds of the Salt Cess shall be considered first by the Regional Board. For this purpose, preliminary estimates detailing the proposal and its estimated cost together with other necessary data shall be prepared by the Regional Officers. The proposals together with the Regional Board's recommendation shall then be considered by the Central Board.

(q) The recommendations of the Central Board shall be submitted to the Central Government for acceptance after which detailed estimates shall be prepared. The estimates shall be sanctioned by competent authority.

(r) No act or proceeding of the Central Board or any of the Regional Boards shall be called in question on the ground merely of the existence of any vacancy in, or defect in the constitution of the Central Board or, as the case may be, any of the Regional Boards.

A. NANU, Dy. Secy.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

(All India Council for Technical Education)

New Delhi-2, the 18th October 1955

No. F-13-55-T-2—The following candidates have passed the National Diploma Examination in Mechanical Engineering held in April 1955 :—

DELHI POLYTECHNIC, DELHI

Pass Class. (Names arranged in alphabetical order).

Roll No.	Name of candidate
27	Jas Pal Singh
28	Lal Madan Mohn
29	Sudhershnan Kumar

The following candidate has been placed in compartment in the subject shown against his name :—

Roll No.	Name of candidate	Subject
26	Sandhu Malkiat Singh	Engineering Production

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Second Class. (Names arranged in alphabetical order).

Roll No.	Name of candidate
32	Nazareth Stanley, J.
34	Thakur Ambika

Pass Class. (Names arranged in alphabetical order).

Roll No.	Name of candidate
36	Anand Rajender Nath
37	Anand Vercendra Nath
38	Mital Satyavir

The following candidates have been placed in compartment in the subjects shown against their names :—

Roll No.	Name of candidate	Subject
31	Meshram Baliram Fandooji.	(i) Heat Engines. (ii) Engineering Economics.
35	Agnihotri Akhilesh Nandan.	(i) Strength of Materials. (ii) Machine Design.

New Delhi-2, the 22nd October 1955

No. F-13-52-53/55-T-2—The following candidates have passed the National Diploma Examination in Electrical Engineering, held in April, 1955.

DELHI POLYTECHNIC, DELHI

First Class. (Names arranged in order of merit).

Roll No.	Name of candidate
11	Ram Pratap

Pass Class. (Names arranged in alphabetical order).

Roll No.	Name of candidate
14	Kohli Mahendra Pal
15	Sharma Inderjit
16	Sood Yoginder Mohan
17	Srivastava Gopal Saran
18	Suraj Parkash

The following candidates have been placed in Compartment in the subject or subjects shown against their names :—
Compartment in one subject

Roll No.	Name of candidate	Subject
9	Goel Mahendra Prakash	Elementary Principles of Telegraphy, Telephony and Radio Communications.
13	Srivastava Anant Narain	Do.

Compartment in two subjects

8	Chopra Sudarshan Kumar.	(i) Theory of Machines (ii) Electrical Engineering
10	Khattar Krishan Lal	(i) Electrical Engineering (ii) Elements of Electrical Design.

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Second Class

Roll No.	Name of candidate
20	Menczes Terence Patrick
22	Tandaiya Jagdish Chandra

Pass Class. (Names arranged in alphabetical order).

Roll No.	Name of candidate
24	Bagal Martand Krishnarao.
25	Mohgaonkar Dinkar Yeshwant.

G. N. VASWANI,
Controller of Examinations.